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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Estate of GERTRUDE FRANDSEN
SHEPLEY, deceased,
Respondent,

case No. 17618

vs.
PAUL J. BARTON, et al.,
PetitionersAppellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from an Order of the Probate Division of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County denying appellants' petition pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3807 (misidentified in the original petition as § 75-3-808) for
an order requiring the personal representative of the abovenamed estate to reserve $10,000 for payment of appellants' claim
for attorney's fees and other expenses which may be awarded in
their action pending in Carbon County for specific performance
of a real estate contract.

This is also an appeal from the

lower court's order denying appellants' alternative petition
pursuant to u.c.A. § 75-3-804(2)

for an order granting them an

extension of time within which they could commence a proceeding
to contest the disallowance of their claim.

These rulings were

reaffirmed by the lower court by its order of February 25, 1981,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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denying appellants' motion for clarification of the earlier
rulings.

This appeal was taken on March 19, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the order denying their

petition for reservation of funds, and if that relief is not
granted, then they seek a reversal of the order denying their
petition for an extension of time to contest their claim, if
it is held that their claim was disallowed.
FACTS
On November 10, 1979, Charles R. Shepley, as attorne,.
in-fact for Gertrude Frandsen Shepley, agreed to sell certab
real property in Carbon County, Utah, known as the Frandsen
Estates to petitioners-appellants

(hereinafter "appellants')

signing an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

~1

Line· f

45 to 48 of the Earnest Money Agreement provide for the recovc:I
of all expenses of enforcing the agreement, including a
attorney's fee.

reascr~

A copy of the Earnest Money Receipt maybe

found at R. 42.
In December, 1979, Gertrude Frandsen Shepley died.
Charles R. Shepley was appointed personal representative of
her estate.

In his capacity as personal representative of the

i

estate, Mr. Shepley refused to close the sales transaction,
contending that certain shares of water stock were not part oi ·
the Sales Agreement, and that the Earnest Money Agreement was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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unenforceable.

To enforce the rights they have acquired in

this property, appellants have already commenced a suit for
specific performance and other relief against 01.arles R. Shepley
as personal representative of the Estate of Gertrude Frandsen
Shepley.
On February 15, 1980, the personal representative of
the estate caused notice to creditors to be published.

R. 21.

The notice to creditors shows Elwood P. Powell as attorney for
the personal representative.

On April 1, 1980, Paul J. Barton,

representing the appellant partners, sent a letter to Elwood P.
Powell, notifying him of their position with regard to the
estate's obligations to transfer the shares of water stock and
notifying him that under the terms of the Earnest Money Agreernent, the estate would be responsible for costs incurred in
settling the dispute.

A copy of this letter appears at R. 44.

Thereafter, Mr. Powell communicated with 01.arles R. Shepley,
the personal representative, with regard to Mr. Barton's letter
of April 1, 1980.

On June 17, 1980, Mr. Powell sent a letter

to appellants' attorney, stating that Mr. Shepley continued to
refuse to include the shares of water stock in the purchase
Price, and further stating the opinion that the Power of Attorney under which Mr. Shepley signed the document on behalf of
Gertrude Frandsen Shepley was legally ineffective.

Nowhere does

Mr. Powell's response mention or even allude to appellants'
claim for all costs involved in settling this dispute.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

I

At a hearing in the Carbon County Court, the at tor·, I
for the estate stated that they intended to resist the

clai~·-1

attorney's fees on the ground that no claim for those fees ha:
been made against the estate, although the Carbon County

Cou~

had already held that a claim for specific performance did r.c:
need to be made against the estate to preserve the right to
specific performance.

R. 35, 67.

Because of their concern

that the Carbon County Court might defer to the court probati::
the estate on this question, because of their belief that thee
had made a sufficient claim on the estate if one was necessar:·,
and to prevent further passage of time from affecting their
right to attorney's fees, appellants determined that the Third
District Court, which was probating the Estate of Gertrude
Frandsen Shepley, should consider the issues concerning their
right to attorney's fees and expenses.

So, appellants petitioned the Third District Court fo: l
an order requiring the personal representative to reserve
$10 ,000 for payment of attorney's fees in case they are awardii

in the specific performance action.

This petition was pursuar.:

to U.C.A. § 75-3-807(1), which provides that, by petition to
the Probate Court,
A claimant whose claim has been
allowed but not paid as provided
in this section may secure an order
directing the personal representative
to pay the claim to the extent that
funds of the estate are available for
the payment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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To protect against the possibility that the Third
District Court might find that it was necessary that a claim
be made on the estate to preserve the right to attorney's
fees, and that a claim was made but disallowed by the estate,
appellants also petitioned in the alternative, in the event
the petition for the reservation of funds was disallowed, for
an order pursuant to U.C.A.

§

75-3-804(2) granting an extension

of time within which to contest a disallowance of their claim.
That section provides for a 60-day period after the personal
representative has mailed a notice of disallowance of a claim
within which to connnence a proceeding on the claim, and further
provides that, "in the case of a claim which is not presently
due or which is contingent or unliquidated • • • to avoid
injustice the court, on petition, may order an extension of
the 60-day period."
In support of their petitions, appellants made the
following arguments:
1.

The claim for attorney's fees and expenses does

not require the presentation of a claim against the decedent's
estate, but is part and parcel of the claim and action for
specific performance, for which no presentation of claim need
be made.

Hence, the claim for attorney's fees and expenses

is automatically allowed (subject to the contingency of an
award of such fees and expenses in the specific performance
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I

-6action), and the petition for reservation of funds to pays.:·
fees and expenses should be granted.

R. 22-25,

Supplem:nta~

Memorandum in Support of Petitions.
2.

If the court were to determine that a claim was

required to be made, the April 1, 19 80, letter from Paul

Bar~·

to the attorney for the estate, which stated that "under the
terms of the original Earnest Money Agreement signed by your
client. •

he will be responsible for the additional costs

we incur in settling this matter"

(R. 44), was a sufficient

presentation of claim against the estate.
3.

R. 35-37.

The June 17, 1980, letter from the attorneys for

the estate (R. 46) was not a disallowance of the claim for
attorney's fees and expenses, but merely an assertion that th:
Earnest Money Agreement was unenforceable against the estate,

j

because of the decedent's alleged incompetence when she execui;::
the Power of Attorney.

i

This was an assertion that the necessa::I

contingency, obtaining specific performance of the Earnest
Money Agreement against the estate, would not occur, but not
a denial that attorney's fees and expenses would be available
if specific performance were ordered.
4.

R. 37-39.

If a claim were necessary and was made, but the

June 17, 19 80, letter was a disallowance of the claim, then
the interests of justice would be served by the court's order
granting the appellants an extension of time within which to
contest the disallowance.

R. 39-40.
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In opposition to appellants' petitions, the estate
argued, aroong other contentions, that no reservation of funds
is necessary for attorney's fees, since appellants could claim
those fees as an offset to the total purchase price they would
have to pay if specific performance is decreed, and that if a
reservation of funds is made, it should be on the last $10,000
appellants pay on the contract.

R. 78.

Hearing was held on appellants' petitions on January
7, 1981, before the Honorable James

s.

Sawaya.

After taking

the matter under advisement, Judge Sawaya denied their petitions
without making any explanation or findings as to the basis for
the denials.

See, Minute Entry, R. 29.

In view of the arguments

made in support of and in opposition to the petitions, appellants
were unable to determine what effect, if any, the denials would
have on their right to attorney's fees in the specific performance
action.

There appear to be four possible reasons for the denial

of the petition for reservation of funds:
1.

There is no need to require such a reservation

since appellants could retain part of the purchase price owing
as an offset to cover any attorney's fees awarded in the specific
performance action.

A holding on this basis would appear to

entail no determination on the necessity of making a claim to
preserve the right to attorney's fees.
2.

A claim against the estate was not necessary to

Preserve the right to attorney's fees, hence the prerequisite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8of the claim being "allowed" by the estate as required by
U.C.A. § 75-3-807(1) is not met.

This would be a holding

that the petition was inappropriate.
3.

A claim was necessary but was not made.

4.

A claim was necessary and was made but was dis·

allowed.
There could be similar spectrum of grounds for the
denial of the petition for an extension of time to contest
dis allowance of appellants' claim for attorney's fees.

Becaus1

the District Court's ruling may or may not have been a deterni·
nation of the necessity of making a claim for attorney's fees
and of the questions whether, if a claim was necessary, one

w~

made and allowed or disallowed, appellants filed a Motion for
Clarification of Ruling {R. 51-52) with the District Court, in
order to obtain that court's guidance as to the meaning of its
order denying their petitions.

The hearing on this Motion was

held February 25, 1981, and the transcript of that hearing is
at R. 65-72.

The appellants' attorney attempted to inform the

court as to their essential difficulties with the ruling: was
i t a determination that they could not obtain attorney's fees
and expenses in the specific performance action, or did the
ruling make no determination of their right to those fees and '
expenses?

But Judge Sawaya believed that denial of the petitic:o',

fully conveyed the court's decision (R. 69), and cone
the petitions were denied on all grounds alleged.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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R. 70.
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appears to appellants that it was inconsistent for the court
to deny their petitions on all grounds alleged, since that
would involve determinations that a claim against the estate
was necessary and also that it was not necessary and that a
sufficient claim was made and also was not made.
Because it appears certain that the estate will argue
in the specific performance action that the determination of
the court below precludes an award of attorney's fees in that
action under the principles of collateral estoppel, though it
does not appear that that was the intent of the court below,
appellants determined that the appropriate way to protect their
right to attorney's fees and expenses was initially to appeal
from the denial of their petitions.

This appeal was taken March

19, 1981.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE
PETITION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING RESERVATION OF FUNDS FOR
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN THE SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE ACTION.
A. The Right to Attorney's Fees and Expenses in
the Specific Performance Action is Not Dependent Upon Making
a Claim Against the Estate.
B. If the Making of a Claim Against the Estate
Was Necessary to Preserve the Right to Recover Attorney's Fees
and Expenses in the Specific Performance Action, Mr. Barton's
Letter of April 1, 1981, was a Sufficient Claim Against the
Estate.

c. Mr. Powell's Letter of June 17, 1980, is Not
a Disallowance of appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees and
Expenses.
POINT II. IF A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE WAS NECESSARY
AND WAS MADE BUT DISALLOWED, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

THE DISTRICT COURT TO DENY APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR AN EXTE~:':'
OF TIME TO CONTEST THE DISALLOWANCE OF THEIR CLAIM.
"----i

I

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIEDTfil
PETITION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING RESERVATION OF FUNDS FORPAYM:r
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE A

A.
Th_e Right to Attorney' s Fees and Expenses in
the Speci fie Performance Action is Not Dependent Upon Making a
Claim Against the Estate.
Appellants' claim for attorney's fees and expensesi:
inseparable from their claim for specific performance.

I

Withe:.

a decree granting specific performance, petitioners will have:
basis to recover their attorney's fees.

A decree of specific

performance would fulfi 11 the only prerequisite to an award of
attorney's fees.

Thus, appellants' right to attorney's feesi:I

an inherent part of the cause of action for specific performar.;'
being tried in Carbon County.

Since, as the Carbon county

Dis~

Court has already ruled, a claim for specific performance ofa

!
1

\

contract to convey real estate need not be made upon the persc:;.
representative of an estate in order to preserve the right to

maintain that cause of action, the right to attorney's fees ar,;\
expenses is likewise preserved regardless of the filing of the\

I

claim with the personal representative.
Forsyth vs. Estate of Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, (Case
No. 16695 Utah, filed September 2, 1980)

( a copy of this

case appears at R. 26-28), involved an action for specific
performance of a real estate contract.

The trial court bad
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-11granted specific performance and $1,000 as attorney's fees.
The defendant-executor contended that plaintiff's failure to
file a claim prevented his recovery, that plaintiff had abandoned
the contract, and that the award of attorney's fees was irrproper,
arrong other contentions.

As to the first contention, the Court

stated:
No claim was filed by plaintiff, nor
in spite of defendant's contention,
was there any need of such claim being
filed.
Id., R. 26.

After determining that it was necessary to remand on

the issue of abandonment of the contract, the Court turned to
the attorney's fees issue, and stated:
Finally, defendant argues that there
should not have been an award made to
plaintiff for attorney's fees.
In light
of our remand it would seem inappropriate
to rule on that question. If, upon the
trial court's further proceedings, it is
found that there was an abandonment, then
plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees
is rendered moot. If it is concluded that
there was no abandonment, then the contract
is still in force and the contractual provisions which pertain to attorney's fees
applies.

13.·•

R. 28.

In Forsyth, the Supreme Court treated the right to

attorney's fees as part and parcel of the right to specific performance, for which no claim need be filed.
this case.

The same is true in

If the District Court in Carbon County grants

specific performance, then appellants should be entitled to
attorney's fees in that action even if no claim were filed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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against the estate in connection with the probate proceedings,,
I

Since a claim for attorney's fees and expenses need !
not be filed against the estate to preserve the right to

obJ

such fees and expenses in the specific performance action, tho
personal representative has no opportunity to disallow such
claim, the claim being contingent only upon the award of such
fees and expenses in the specific performance action.

Hence,

the claim is one which is necessarily allowed against the
estate subject to that contingency, making i t appropriate for
the Probate Court to order, pursuant to u.c.A.

§

75-3-807(1),

that $10 ,000 be reserved for the payment of such attorney's
fees and expenses in the event that they are awarded.

Such an

order, even if it requires the reservation of the last $10,000
of the purchase price to be paid by appellants if specific per·
formance is granted, will prevent the personal representative
from making anticipatory assignments to beneficiaries of the

I
'!

purchase money without accounting for the obligation to pay
attorney's fees and expenses.

·1

B. If The Making of a Claim Against the Estate Was
Necessary To Preserve The Right to Recover Attorney's Fees And I
Expenses In The Specific Performance Action, Mr. Barton's Lettertl
of April 1, 1981, Was a Sufficient Claim Against The Estate. I
If it was necessary for appellants to make a claim

1
1

against the estate to preserve their right to attorney's fees

[

and expenses, the necessary manner of presentation of tha claill 1
t

would be governed by U.C.A.

§

75-3-804, which provides in rele· I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vant part as follows:
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate
may be presented as follows:
(a) The claimant may deliver or
mail to the personal representative a
written statement of the claim indicating
its basis, the name and address of the
claimant, and the amount claimed.
The letter sent by Mr. Barton to Mr. Powell on April 1,

1980, is found at R. 44.

That letter directs further correspon-

dence to be to Mr. Richard Bird, with an address given, and
states that the basis of the claim for the fees and expenses
at issue here is the Earnest Money Agreement signed by Mr.
Shepley, and that the am:>unt claimed would be "the additional
costs we incur in settling this matter."

It would be inpossible

to have made a more specific claim for such costs at that time,
since they were contingent and unliquidated.

Hence, the sub-

stantive contents of this notice are sufficient.
The remaining question is whether i t was sufficient
under the statute to send this notice to the attorney for the
personal representative rather than to the personal representative himself.

The pleadings and papers filed on behalf of the

personal representative in the probate action show that Elwood

I
I

.111

P. Powell has been the attorney of record for the estate throughout.

His name appeared in the published Notice to Creditors,

found at R. 21.

As

attorney of re=rd for the estate he was

acting as agent for the personal representative on legal matters
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the estate, and it was clearly within the scope of his
agency to transrni t to and discuss with the personal represen·
tative the claims of which he had been made aware.

In addi·

tion, as an officer of the court with respect to this matter,
Mr. POW'ell had a professional duty to the court to transmit
claims to the personal representative.

For these reasons, a

written claim sent to the attorney for the estate is a suffic1;
claim made upon the personal representative.
In fact, it is clear that Mr. Powell did discuss with
and transmit to Mr. Shepley the appellants' claims.

Mr.Powel!';

June 17, 1980, response to Mr. Barton's April 1, letter (R.

~i·

46) states in relevant part as follows:

I have been in touch with the personal
representative of the above estate,
Charles R. Shepley, and have discussed
with him both your letter and Mr. Barton's
letter of April 1, 1980.

R. 45.

I

I

Utah courts have not ruled on whether a claim mailed \
to the attorney for the estate of a decedent is sufficient to
constitute presentation of the claim to the personal represen·
tative.

As stated above, that result should follow from the

I

application of agency law to this situation, and from the duty
an attorney owes to the court.

However, the Oregon Court of

Appeals was recently required to rule upon this precise ques·
tion.

In Wilson vs. Culbertson, 599 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Ore .
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-15App. 1979), the court stated as follows:

en·

1,

.c;;

)•

ORS 115.005(1) provides that "claims
against the estate of a decedent • •
shall be presented to the personal
re pres entati ve."
Where, as here, a claim made by
letter to decedent's business establishment was transmitted to and
answered by defendant's attorney on
behalf of the estate, the personal
representative has notice of the
claim and opportunity to resolve it,
hence, even though the claim is made
indirectly rather than directly, all
purposes of ORS 115.005(1) have been
accorrplished. Accordingly, we hold
that the claim has been "presented"
to the personal representative within
the meaning of the statute.
A similar holding is found in Edwards vs. Brirmn, 367 S .w. 2d 433
(Ark. 1963) •

There, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a

claim made by giving notice to the executrix' attorney in
compliance with the statute regarding service on the attorney
of record of a party was sufficient as being in substantial
compliance with the statute requiring giving notice of filing
a claim to the executrix.
For these reasons it should be held as a matter of
law that if it was necessary for a claim to be made against
the estate to preserve the right to attorney's fees and expenses
in the specific performance action, Mr. Barton's April 1, 1980,
letter to the attorney for the estate was in substantial comPliance with the statutory requirements and fulfilled all the
statute's purposes, and should be held to be a sufficient claim.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-16c. Mr. Powell's Letter of June 17, 1980, Is Not a
Disallowance of Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees and
Expenses.
u.c.A. § 75-3-806 (1) provides in relevant part that:

!

The personal representative may
mail a notice to any claimant stating
that the claim has been disallowed • •
Failure of the personal representative
to mail notice to a claimant of action
on his claim for 60 days after the time
for original presentation of the claim
has expired has the effect of a notice
of allowance.
Mr. Powell's letter of June 17, 1980,

(R. 45-46) does

not at any point advise appellants that their claim for the
costs of enforcing the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur·
chase is disallowed.

It does not even mention appellants'

claim for these expenses.

The statute just quoted therefore

treats the personal representative's silence on appellants'
claim as an allowance of that claim.
Of course, appellants' claim against the estate for
those expenses was necessarily contingent, both at the time
the claim was made and still today.

The claim is contingent

on the enforceability of the Earnest Money Agreement against
the estate, and on a resolution of the dispute regarding the
water stock in favor of appellants.

Those two issues will be

resolved in the lawsuit pending in Carbon County.

Mr. Powell's

June 17th letter covers both of these issues, by asserting that
the water stock was not included in the Earnest Money Agreement
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-17and that Gertrude Frandsen Shepley was not corrpetent at the
time she signed the Power of Attorney pursuant to which 01.arles
R. Shepley signed the Earnest Money Agreement in her behalf.
Mr. Powell's conclusion that the Earnest Money Agreement is
unenforceable against the estate is based upon his legal conclusion that Mrs. Shepley was inco:rcpetent.

However, the

enforceability of the Earnest Money Agreement was one of the
contingencies inherent in appellants' claim for the expenses
of enforcing that agreement against the estate.

Mr. Powell's

letter merely asserts that the contingencies which would have
to occur for the claim to become an obligation of the estate
would not occur.

The letter did not deny that the Earnest

Money Agreement provides for the expenses of enforcing that
agreement, but discussed the merits of the issues now pending
before the Carbon County court.
Because the June 17th letter merely stated a legal
conclusion on the part of Mr. Powell and Mr. Shepley that the
contingencies involved in appellants' claim would not occur,
rather than an assertion that the claim would not be owing
if those contingencies did occur, the letter did not aIIDunt

to a disallowance of appellants' claim.

Because no other

communications were received in the statutory 60-day period,
Petitioners' claim was allowed by operation of U.C.A.

§

75-3-

806 ( 1) •
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-18POINT I I.
IF A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE WAS NECESfilii
AND WAS MADE BUT DISALLOWED, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETIONli!
THE DISTRICT COURT TO DENY APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR AN EXTEi;:'
SION OF TIME TO CONTEST THE DISALLOWANCE OF THEIR CLAIM.
U.C.A. § 75-3-804(2) provides as follows:
If a claim is presented under (1) (a)
above, no proceeding thereon may be
commenced more than 60 days after the
personal representative has mailed a
notice of disallowance; but in the case
of a claim which is not presently due
or which is contingent or unliquidated
• • • to avoid injustice the court, on
petition, may order an extension of the
60-day period, but in no event shall
the extension run beyond the applicable
statute of limitations.
Where a contingent claim such as that of appellants
is involved, this statute allows the court to grant an exten·
sion of time to claimants whose claims have been disallowed
when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

Although

appellants recognize that the statute merely grants the Distri

Court discretion to grant an extension in the interest of ju;t
appellants believe that it was an abuse of discretion to deny
their petition in this case, if a claim was necessary and was
made but disallowed.
The personal representative and his attorney were
advised of appellants' claim by Mr. Barton's April 1, 1980,
letter.

Mr. Powell's June 17, 1980, response to this letter

was vague and reasonably interpreted by appellants as not

addressing their claim for the e~enses of enforcing the Earn<

Money Agreement, but rather as addressing the substantive i 551
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-19relating to the enforceability of that agreement which will
be resolved in the specific performance action.

If i t is

now determined that that letter was a disallowance of appellants' claim, it would be unfair to preclude them from disputing that disallowance.

By refusing to use its discretion,

in the interest of justice, by granting an extension of time
to contest the disallowance, the District Court has allowed the
personal representative to gain an advantage for the estate
(and himself as a beneficiary) by treating appellants' claim
for attorney's fees and expenses vaguely and indirectly, rather
than directly stating whether the claim is allowed or disallowed.
It is certainly not the intent of the Probate Code to place a
premium on deceptive practices, and the District Court failed
to prevent such a result by refusing to use its discretion to
allow the appellants' entitlement to attorney's fees to be
aired on its merits by granting an extension of time to contest
disallowance.
Another factor indicating the propriety of granting an
extension of time to dispute the disallowance is the continuing
nature of the contingencies upon which the appellants' claim
would become an obligation of the estate.

As noted above, these

contingencies will be resolved in the specific performance action
in Carbon County, and only then would the liability of the
estate for the expenses of enforcing the Earnest Money Agreement
be determined.

There has been no delay involved in the deter-
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-20-

mination of the estate's liability for these expenses.

The

issue is a collateral one in the specific performance action '
and will be determined by the other issues in that action.

'!

Hence, the estate has not been prejudiced by any delays in
processing petitioners' claim.

In addition, there has been

no delay in distribution of the estate's assets, since the
parties agree that the attorney's fees may be reserved as an

I
'

offset to the total purchase price which has to be paid if th!,
specific performance action is successful.

R.

78, 79.

i

For these reasons, if a claim for attorney's fees anci

I

expenses was necessary and was made but was disallowed by the
June 17th letter of Elwood P. Powell, i t was an abuse of dis·
cretion and clearly contrary to the interests of justice for
the District Court to deny appellants' petition for an order
extending the time within which to contest the dis allowance oi
their claim.
CONCLUSION
For the purpose of obtaining a determination of their
right to attorney's fees in their specific performance action
against the Estate of Gertrude Frandsen Shepley now pending in 1
the District Court in Carbon County, and for the purpose of
avoiding any prejudice to their right to such fees and expensei
by the further passage of time, appellants petitioned the Thiro
District Court in which the estate was being probated pursuant
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-21to what appeared to be the most promising statutes for accomplishing those purposes.

Admittedly, those statutes did not

supply the perfect vehicle for obtaining a determination on
all the relevant issues, but appellants believed when filing
their petitions, and still believe, that the issues of the
necessity for making a claim for attorney's fees; whether a
claim, if necessary, was made against the estate; whether such
claim was allowed or disallowed; and whether, if a necessary
claim were made but disallowed, the interests of justice
required an extension of time to contest that disallowance,
were properly brought before the District Court by appellants'
petitions pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-807 and 75-3-804.
Unfortunately, the District Court's decision on those
petitions, a si:nple denial, without explanation, did not convey
any guidance to appellants as to the status of their rights,
especially in view of the argument of the estate that a reservation of funds would be unnecessary since the attorney's fees
and expenses could be used as an offset to the am:>unts which
will be owing to the estate in the event the Carbon County
Court declares specific performance.

The District Court's

decision may or may not have been intended to be a decision
of whether appellants will be entitled to attorney's fees if
specific performance is granted, but the possibility that the
estate would try to use the decision for its collateral estoppel
effect on the right to attorney's fees in the Carbon County
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-22action forced appellants to attempt to determine the basis fo:
the District Court's ruling.

That was the purpose for the

.

Motion for Clarification of Ruling, which resulted in no claJ
fication whatsoever.

In that posture, and to protect their

i
!

,
rights, appellants took this appeal from the denial of their [
petitions.
The District Court's denial of the petition for rese:·i
vation of funds was erroneous.

I

First, no claim need have bee·:

I

made against the estate to preserve the contractual right to
attorney's fees and expenses which might be awarded in the
specific performance action.

1
1

1

Hence, the right to such fees

and expenses constitutes a claim which is necessarily allowed
by the estate subject to the contingency of award in the spec1·
fie performance action, making appropriate an order reserving I
funds to pay such fees and expenses.

I

Second, if it was neces· i

sary to make a claim against the estate to preserve the right\
to attorney's fees and expenses, Paul Barton's letter of April:
1, 1980, was a sufficient claim, and that claim was not disallowed.

A reservation of funds was appropriate, and appe 11an'[·

1

I

would be satisfied if the last $10,000 to be paid by appellant!!
on the purchase price were ordered reserved.

This would have

clarified their right to attorney's fees and would have preven:':
the personal representative from making other prior obligations
for that money.
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Although the estate has claimed that an order reserving
funds is unnecessary since the attorney's fees and expenses
could be claimed as an offset against the purchase price, without such an order the estate will challenge any claim of offset
in the specific performance action as being barred by the claim
provisions of the Probate Code.

An order reserving the last

$10,000 of the purchase price will settle the issue and prevent
the estate from constantly pointing to the "other" pending action
as the appropriate one for settling the right to attorney's fees.
Finally, if a claim was necessary but was disallowed,
the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant
appellants an extension of time to contest that disallowance,
and its denial should be reversed.

There was no testimony and

this court need not defer to the impressions of the trial court.
For these reasons, appellants respectfully request
this court to reverse the trial court's ruling on the petition
to require reservation of funds for the payment of the contingent claim to attorney's fees and expenses, or if appropriate,
to reverse the District Court's ruling on the petition for an
extension of time within which to contest a disallowance of
their claim, if there was a disallowance.
DATED this

jf.!_ day

of June, 1981.

Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
l!Cf~\RC

!. 21RO, :JI,
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Attorneys for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

f I;

..!::..!__

day of June, 1981,

I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief,
postage prepaid, to Elwood P. Powell, CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN &
POWELL, 900 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
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